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CASE NOTES
IPROCEDURE-EFFECT OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTE IN
ACTIONS WHERE SECRETARY OF STATE IS SERVED
AS STATUTORY AGENT
Acting under a non-resident motorist statute, plaintiff served the Secre-
tary of State of Missouri as the statutory agent of the Illinois defendants.
Seven days later a registered letter was received by the defendants inform-
ing them of the action. Twenty days thereafter defendants filed a petition
for removal to the federal courts. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to the
state court on the ground that the petition was not filed within the twenty
day period provided by the federal removal statute.' The motion to
remand was denied on thie ground that the twenty day period allowed by
statute within which to bring such a petition started to run only after the
copy of the service was received by the defendant. Welker v. Hefner,
97 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mo., 195).
This case presents a departure from prior decisions interpreting the
recently amended federal rules for the removal of causes of action in state
civil proceedings. The first case construing Section i446(b) which in-
volved facts identical to the instant case, held that the twenty day period
for removal commenced upon service on the Secretary of State.2 In both
cases, service on the Secretary of State was held to have completed service
for the purpose of the state court proceedings. Dicta in a recent case in-
volving the same type of state statute as to service of process indicated
that although the particular facts of that case made removal untimely
whatever criterion was utilized, the period should commence when
service was had on the Secretary of State.3 This court mentioned with
approval the reasoning employed by the court in Helgeson v. Barz4 which
also held that service on the Secretary of State started the period.
The removal statute was interpreted in federal district court cases in
New York, and Kansas,0 both involving a state statute which provided that
service was not complete until a certain number of days had elapsed fol-
lowing the receipt by the defendant of a copy of the process. The court
162 Stat. 939 (1948), as amended 28 U.S.C.A. S i446(b) ('949). Pertinent pro-
visions provide: "The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be
filed within twenty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or other-
wise, of a copy of the initial pleading .. " The original removal provision provided
in part: Removal is possible "at any time before the defendant is required by the
laws of the state or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought to answer
or plead." 36 Stat. io95 (19II), 28 U.S.C. S 7Z (1940).
2 Helgeson v. Barz, 89 F. Supp. 429 (Minn., 195o).
8Youngson v. Lusk, 96 F. Supp. 8s (Neb., 195t).
4 89 F. Supp. 429 (Minn., 1950).
5 Alexander v. Peter Holding Company, 94 F. Supp. 299 (ED. N.Y., 1950).
6 Merz v. Dixon, 95 F. Supp. i93 (Kan., 195i).
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in ofle of the cases pointed out that "there was no pending action which
could hav'c been removed, until the ... essential elements of service, filing
and the lapse of ten days thereafter, had been accomplished."' Both courts
ruled that the twenty day period started only after service of process was
complete as provided in the state statute.
Thus the decisions depended on the applicable state statute as to when
service of process had been completed. In all of the cases before the
Welker decision, an attempt was made to comply with the intention of the
congressional revisors as to uniformity. These draftsmen had stated: "As
thus revised, the section will give adequate time and operate uniformly
throughout the federal jurisdiction.""
The purpose of the revision of the removal statute was not to present a
period which would be mathematically exact in every case, but to provide
an ascertainable date from which the twenty day removal period could be
definitely computed. Professor Moore, in his Commentary on the U.S.
Judicial Code, states that "under Section 1446(b).... the time for removal
is geared essentially to the initiation of the state court action.... ." Once,
therefore, that the definite date was selected, there would remain only the
necessity of applying the removal period to that date. In this manner sub-
stantial uniformity throughout the states would be guaranteed.
There are but two other possibilities as to the revisors' intentions. If the
removal statute were to be interpreted in strict compliance with the
Helgeson decision, and the twenty day period were held to start upon
service on the Secretary of State, regardless of the particular state view as
to when an action commenced, removal would be possible in a situation
where there was actually no suit pending in the state court. If the state
statute deemed process complete only after a certain period following
service on the Secretary of State, and at the same time, the matter were
removable immediately upon service on the Secretary of State, again the
fantastic result would be presented that removal was theoretically possible
when no case was pending.
Equally absurd would be the conclusion reached if the Welker decision
were followed. If the removal period were construed as starting only a
certain number of days after actual receipt by the defendant of a copy of
the service, and at the same time process was considered complete under
the state statute upon service on the Secretary of State, judgment could
possibly be entered in the state court before the period for removal had
ever commenced.
It is true that either of these theories would guarantee full rights to the
defendant if all the state statutes were similar, but such a similarity simply
7 Alexander v. Peter Holding Company, 94 F. Supp. 299, 300 (E.D. N.Y., 195o).
8 Revisors' Note, z8 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (1949).
9 Moore, Commentary on U.S. Judicial Code 273 (1949).
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does not cxist. The more practical solution was that adopted by the courts
in the majority of dccisions interpreting the removal statute. Not only is it
the more workable solution, but it is also that which was intended by the
revisors. Until the Welker decision the courts solidly tried to maintain this
uniformity by making the exact date when the twenty day period had
started more easily and more objectively ascertainable.
In an effort to safeguard more completely the rights of the defendant
seeking removal, the court in the Welker case departed from the estab-
lished pattern, and in so doing, took one step toward defeating the purpose
of the statute. The Welker decision, however, properly points up the re-
gard which must be had for the rights of the defendant. While the deci-
sion here discussed would certainly guarantee that a defendant would not
be deprived of his rights, yet to protect those rights at the risk of destroy-
ing the uniformity sought by the revisors seems to be a great price to pay
for the occasional safeguard which it provides. The motives which com-
pelled the court to reach the Welker decision cannot be questioned, but it
seems that the wisdom which guided the earlier decisions resulted in a
preferable judicial treatment of the removal statute.
